<div class="phx-topic abstract-wrapper">Refrigerated transportation has come a long way from the days when Union Pacific Railroad put huge chunks of ice in boxcars to keep produce or meat from spoiling as it moved to market. </div>

Refrigerated transportation has come a long way from the days when Union Pacific Railroad put huge chunks of ice in boxcars to keep produce or meat from spoiling as it moved to market.

<div>Refrigerated transportation has come a long way from the days when Union Pacific Railroad put huge chunks of ice in boxcars to keep produce or meat from spoiling as it moved to market.It’s not just a matter of refrigeration; modified atmosphere means apples can taste fresh after months in storage and a slow ocean journey to a far-off port. Modified atmosphere containers also can be used to deliver roses by ocean, instead of air.Last month, I had the opportunity to try some exotic species of Korean fish. <a>The dishes featured olive flounder, black rockfish and turbot that had been swimming...

Refrigerated transportation has come a long way from the days when Union Pacific Railroad put huge chunks of ice in boxcars to keep produce or meat from spoiling as it moved to market. It’s not just a matter of refrigeration; modified atmosphere means apples can taste fresh after months in storage and a slow ocean journey to a far-off port. Modified atmosphere containers also can be used to deliver roses by ocean, instead of air. Last month, I had the opportunity to try some exotic species of Korean fish. The dishes featured olive flounder, black rockfish and turbot that had been swimming in nearby tanks , right up until they were cleaned, cooked and served after having been imported live from Korea. Technology developed by a number of companies has given the food and floral industries the opportunity to reach new markets using ocean transportation instead of more costly air freight. The biggest hurdle to widespread use of the technology is cost. The maritime tank containers used to bring the live fish from Korea cost more than $100,000 each. And containers equipped with modified-atmosphere capabilities cost more than the typical refrigerated box (which isn’t cheap at $18,000 to $20,000). Equipment that expensive has to be operated efficiently and used frequently to make sense. A white paper put out by an industry working group points out that today’s operating methods don’t translate into financial viability. The Grey Reefer Asset Management Round Table met in Antwerp earlier this year to discuss the possibility of developing an industry management pool concept for reefer boxes, similar to the chassis gray pools being used in the U.S. One of the group’s findings is that the average reefer box makes just four round- trip voyages a year and is held in service for about 9 ½ years. When the initial cost of $18,000 to $20,000 is factored in, the answer to the equation is rather shocking: The average reefer box makes 35 trips in its lifetime at a fixed cost of more than $500 per trip. In theory, setting up a system that would allow neutral managers to control boxes and direct them to the next paying load without expensive repositioning could increase productivity and help keep costs down. It’s also a concept that will be complex, controversial and perhaps years away. Steamship lines have traditionally taken the position that they want to own, or at least control, the equipment. Insurance claims on loads damaged in transit are costly in the reefer sector, and the carriers say they are in the best position to keep quality high and claims down. Demand for refrigerated shipping is growing, but profit and revenue haven’t followed suit. That has led carriers to postpone buying more boxes. To profitably meet demand and stay in the black, container carriers may have to start thinking in shades of gray. Contact Stephanie Nall at stephnalljoc@gmail.com .

Maritime

Cool Cargo News

Cold Shades of Gray

<div class="phx-topic abstract-wrapper">The doubling in bunker fuel prices in some key hubs since the war in the Middle East began six weeks ago is focusing industry attention on energy costs as supply scarcity worsens.</div>

The doubling in bunker fuel prices in some key hubs since the war in the Middle East began six weeks ago is focusing industry attention on energy costs as supply scarcity worsens.

Feature image

<div class="phx-topic">Elevated energy prices due to the war in Iran are complicating, and in some cases slowing, some annual trans-Pacific service contract negotiations between container lines and US importers as emergency fees push up container spot rates. Bunker fuel prices, which doubled in many key hubs in the days after the war in the Middle East began disrupting oil supply six weeks ago, have focused shippers’ attention on how the higher carrier operating costs will be passed onto them via bunker adjustment factors (BAFs) and emergency bunker fuel surcharges. Container lines can give few assurances on the limits to the higher costs their customers face as shipowners scramble to secure fuel supplies for May and June amid worsening scarcity. Still, there’s little concern that the increased attention on the fuel component of freight rates will derail finalizing 2026-27 service contracts, which typically go in effect May 1. The last time attention to fuel – which is generally treated as a simple pass-through cost within contracts – complicated contract talks was in 2019, ahead of impending low-sulfur regulations. This year, the impact of the war has helped carriers secure higher rates than last year, even when fuel was excluded, two container line executives said. Unlike in past years when negotiated contract rates slipped in early March, one of the carrier executives noted his pricing power increased as the impact of the war widened. The war began on Feb. 28. But increased annual costs from labor, port tariffs and landside transport make most of the contract rate gains a wash compared to rate levels secured last year, the two executives said. Container spot rates, as measured by various indices, have been rising steadily since late February and early March before ascending even higher in early April. Emergency fuel surcharges began taking effect in the first week of April, following a 30-day review by maritime regulators. The cost to ship an FEU from Shanghai to Los Angeles hit $2,910 in the week ended April 9, a $900 increase from six weeks prior, according to Drewry’s World Container Index. <h3>Higher pass-on costs </h3>Container lines have imperfect means to recoup higher fuel costs and the additional costs accrued through disruption. BAFs can lag up to 90 days, hampering carriers’ cash flow in the meantime. US maritime regulators have prevented carriers from immediately implementing emergency surcharges, <a href="https://www.joc.com/article/fmc-again-rejects-maersk-petition-to-waive-notice-period-for-emergency-fuel-surcharge-6199261">forcing them to adhere to the 30-day notice period</a>, as required by US shipping law. The war has had minimal direct impact on container shipping, affecting just 1% to 2% of the total global capacity that typically transits the Strait of Hormuz. But the growing scarcity of bunker fuel in Asia has forced some ships to alter routings to refuel at alternative hubs, thus burning more fuel and accruing higher operating costs, a third carrier executive said. The rejection by Chinese authorities of emergency bunker fuel surcharges has further complicated efforts by carriers to recoup higher costs from exporters in China. The severity of emergency surcharges varies by carrier, but all are easily in the hundreds of dollars to ship an FEU from Asia to the US West Coast. US importers shipping contracted cargo can also be subject to emergency bunker fuel surcharges even if language within their contract restricts such fees. That’s prompting discussions during contract negotiations about just how much exposure cargo owners face from future fees. Shippers and forwarders are also trying to resist attempts by some carriers to calculate BAFs on a monthly rather than quarterly basis. “I can’t mask my frustration about this. The fuel charge in the contract becomes nothing more than a glorified (freight-all-kinds) rate,” a forwarder told the Journal of Commerce. “It nullifies our ability to get longer-term rates for purposes of stability and visibility.” <h3>War volatility outstrips BAF </h3>A fourth carrier executive explained that the BAF was a “pre-war mechanism” that worked well when bunker fuel prices were relatively stable. But the recent surge in oil prices since March is adding literally <a href="https://www.joc.com/article/war-adding-40-50-million-per-week-to-hapag-lloyds-costs-ceo-6193532">millions of dollars a week to carriers’ costs</a>. “When oil prices come back down — whenever that is — I don’t think anyone thinks that the price (of bunker fuel) will stay like this,” the carrier source said. “The rate will go back down to the pre-war rate.” The second-quarter BAF shouldn’t be too onerous for most shippers since it will mostly reflect the far less volatile January and February fuel prices, said Jason Cook, chief executive of Ardent Global Logistics. A sustained period of higher fuel prices through March and into the second quarter, however, will mean much higher BAF charges are coming in the third quarter. Shippers may try to frontload third-quarter cargo throughout May and June to avoid paying the higher BAF, he said. “For the second quarter, the BAF should be pretty mild,” Cook said. “It won’t really show up until the third quarter.” Contact Mark Szakonyi at <a href="mailto:mark.szakonyi@spglobal.com">mark.szakonyi@spglobal.com</a>. Senior editors Michael Angell and Bill Mongelluzzo contributed to this report. </div>

Elevated energy prices due to the war in Iran are complicating, and in some cases slowing, some annual trans-Pacific service contract negotiations between container lines and US importers as emergency fees push up container spot rates. Bunker fuel prices, which doubled in many key hubs in the days after the war in the Middle East began disrupting oil supply six weeks ago, have focused shippers’ attention on how the higher carrier operating costs will be passed onto them via bunker adjustment factors (BAFs) and emergency bunker fuel surcharges. Container lines can give few assurances on the limits to the higher costs their customers face as shipowners scramble to secure fuel supplies for May and June amid worsening scarcity. Still, there’s little concern that the increased attention on the fuel component of freight rates will derail finalizing 2026-27 service contracts, which typically go in effect May 1. The last time attention to fuel – which is generally treated as a simple pass-through cost within contracts – complicated contract talks was in 2019, ahead of impending low-sulfur regulations. This year, the impact of the war has helped carriers secure higher rates than last year, even when fuel was excluded, two container line executives said. Unlike in past years when negotiated contract rates slipped in early March, one of the carrier executives noted his pricing power increased as the impact of the war widened. The war began on Feb. 28. But increased annual costs from labor, port tariffs and landside transport make most of the contract rate gains a wash compared to rate levels secured last year, the two executives said. Container spot rates, as measured by various indices, have been rising steadily since late February and early March before ascending even higher in early April. Emergency fuel surcharges began taking effect in the first week of April, following a 30-day review by maritime regulators. The cost to ship an FEU from Shanghai to Los Angeles hit $2,910 in the week ended April 9, a $900 increase from six weeks prior, according to Drewry’s World Container Index. Higher pass-on costs Container lines have imperfect means to recoup higher fuel costs and the additional costs accrued through disruption. BAFs can lag up to 90 days, hampering carriers’ cash flow in the meantime. US maritime regulators have prevented carriers from immediately implementing emergency surcharges, forcing them to adhere to the 30-day notice period , as required by US shipping law. The war has had minimal direct impact on container shipping, affecting just 1% to 2% of the total global capacity that typically transits the Strait of Hormuz. But the growing scarcity of bunker fuel in Asia has forced some ships to alter routings to refuel at alternative hubs, thus burning more fuel and accruing higher operating costs, a third carrier executive said. The rejection by Chinese authorities of emergency bunker fuel surcharges has further complicated efforts by carriers to recoup higher costs from exporters in China. The severity of emergency surcharges varies by carrier, but all are easily in the hundreds of dollars to ship an FEU from Asia to the US West Coast. US importers shipping contracted cargo can also be subject to emergency bunker fuel surcharges even if language within their contract restricts such fees. That’s prompting discussions during contract negotiations about just how much exposure cargo owners face from future fees. Shippers and forwarders are also trying to resist attempts by some carriers to calculate BAFs on a monthly rather than quarterly basis. “I can’t mask my frustration about this. The fuel charge in the contract becomes nothing more than a glorified (freight-all-kinds) rate,” a forwarder told the Journal of Commerce. “It nullifies our ability to get longer-term rates for purposes of stability and visibility.” War volatility outstrips BAF A fourth carrier executive explained that the BAF was a “pre-war mechanism” that worked well when bunker fuel prices were relatively stable. But the recent surge in oil prices since March is adding literally millions of dollars a week to carriers’ costs . “When oil prices come back down — whenever that is — I don’t think anyone thinks that the price (of bunker fuel) will stay like this,” the carrier source said. “The rate will go back down to the pre-war rate.” The second-quarter BAF shouldn’t be too onerous for most shippers since it will mostly reflect the far less volatile January and February fuel prices, said Jason Cook, chief executive of Ardent Global Logistics. A sustained period of higher fuel prices through March and into the second quarter, however, will mean much higher BAF charges are coming in the third quarter. Shippers may try to frontload third-quarter cargo throughout May and June to avoid paying the higher BAF, he said. “For the second quarter, the BAF should be pretty mild,” Cook said. “It won’t really show up until the third quarter.” Contact Mark Szakonyi at  mark.szakonyi@spglobal.com . Senior editors Michael Angell and Bill Mongelluzzo contributed to this report.

Container lines

Forwarding

Asia-Europe

Trans-Pacific

Container Shipping News

War-driven fuel costs add new twist to trans-Pacific service contract talks

<div class="phx-topic abstract-wrapper">While the $4.2 billion transaction still requires approvals from the Israeli government, it points to an appetite for consolidation among carriers despite the lack of financial distress that accompanied earlier merger eras. </div>

While the $4.2 billion transaction still requires approvals from the Israeli government, it points to an appetite for consolidation among carriers despite the lack of financial distress that accompanied earlier merger eras.

<div class="phx-topic">Could another round of container shipping consolidation be approaching? Hapag-Lloyd's planned $4.2 billion acquisition of Zim Integrated Shipping Services, announced in February, shows a growing appetite among carriers for scale, including through consolidation, despite the lack of financial hardship that drove earlier rounds of industry M&amp;A. The risk of falling behind is acute. No. 1 carrier Mediterranean Shipping Co. (MSC), at 21.6% of the global fleet by capacity following a massive expansion since the pandemic, is now more than three times the size of No. 5 Hapag-Lloyd and No. 6 Ocean Network Express (ONE), according to Alphaliner rankings. MSC has accounted for 33.6% of total container carrier fleet growth since 2000, according to the analyst. As a result, mid-sized carriers — even those firmly within the top 10 — are realizing the urgency of building scale to remain competitive with the top carriers, pursuing that goal by aggressively acquiring tonnage and potentially considering the possibility of once unthinkable M&amp;A. <div class="wrapper-narrow float-right-element"><img src="/images/phoenix/6202639_0.1.jpg"></img></div>“With post-COVID and the outsized profits from that time period, you are seeing carriers focus on a ‘core’ or ‘integrator’ strategy, but in both cases, scale is still key,” Brian Nemeth, global co-leader of logistics and transportation at Alix Partners, told the Journal of Commerce. A “core” strategy would be a focus on ocean shipping and terminals while “integrator” refers to end-to-end activities including origin consolidation, warehousing, last-mile and visibility. With fewer large carriers remaining — the top 10 control more than 85% percent of the fleet today versus 48% in 1996, according to analyst Lars Jensen — merger opportunities are harder to find, though any further deals would continue a longstanding industry trend. “The liner shipping industry has seen a persistent drive towards consolidation for more than 30 years,” Jensen wrote in his book Liner Shipping 2025, published in 2017. While the Zim deal still requires approvals from the Israeli government, the fact Hapag-Lloyd was able to overcome national security and other obstacles in signing the merger agreement shows that deals some might have regarded as impossible may in fact be within reach. “I was somewhat surprised that Zim would do a deal like Hapag, for many reasons including cultural differences, but also from the point of view of Israeli national security,” consultant and former senior Maersk executive Robbert van Trooijen told the Journal of Commerce. “The fact they found a solution to this, assuming (the deal closes), they have proven there are solutions to be found,” he said. <h3>The vulnerability of mid-sized carriers </h3>For example, would Japan ever allow Ocean Network Express (ONE), which consolidated its three largest ocean carriers in 2017, to be merged into a larger combined carrier? As important as the trade-dependent nation views shipping, some believe ONE is sub-scale in the current environment, a point that could apply to several other Asian carriers. A deal to privatize South Korea’s HMM <a href="https://www.joc.com/article/hmms-48-billion-share-sale-is-scrapped-over-management-control-issue-5215009">collapsed in 2024</a> but could one day be revived. “Assume in the next three to five years the industry, which has an unprecedented orderbook of 35% of the global existing fleet, enters a downturn,” van Trooijen said. “There must be a moment where the 1-2 million TEU players start asking themselves, ‘where do we see ourselves 10 years from now?’” The record 35% order book as a percentage of the existing fleet by itself illustrates top carriers’ aggressive pursuit of scale. As of December, the top 10 carriers controlled 79% of the order book, though the actual figure is likely around 85% when expected long-term charters are figured in, according to Alphaliner chief analyst Jan Tiedemann. Under its “2030 Strategy” unveiled in 2024, ONE aims to increase its capacity to 3 million TEUs, a 42% increase from its current fleet size. In March, <a href="https://www.joc.com/article/one-boosts-ownership-stake-in-seaspan-parent-poseidon-6184045">it increased its stake to 48.9% in the parent company of Seaspan</a>, the largest non-operating owner of container ships. HMM in its own 2030 strategy plan also aims to double its fleet size. Increasing the vulnerability of mid-sized carriers is the possibility the alliances they participate in break up, leaving them at the mercy of larger carriers to expand market coverage beyond what their own fleet capacity can provide. “Hapag-Lloyd leaving its prior alliance to join up with Maersk shows you can’t always depend on stable alliances,” van Trooijen said, observing an emerging disconnect between smaller carriers’ aggressive vessel orders in pursuit of scale and their underlying commercial ability to fill the ships. “In other words (in the event their alliance breaks up), the smaller players run the risk of being left out in the cold where they have big ships but don’t have scale to support that,” he added. “That could very well happen.” <h3>Carriers in good position to withstand downturn </h3>That is further reason why the Hapag/Zim deal, coming at a time when carriers remain flush with cash from the pandemic and thus, according to some, are well-prepared to weather any downturn associated with the high order book, may represent a turning point. “When we look at the industry and when we look at this downturn which we are talking about, I think the industry is very well-prepared,” S&amp;P Global analyst Rahul Kapoor told TPM26 in March. Indeed, according to Alix Partners, the Hapag/Zim deal was announced amid a strong financial phase for the industry, a change from the prior consolidation wave culminating in 2016 and 2017 when the industry was on much shakier ground financially, illustrated by the Hanjin bankruptcy in August 2016. <div class="wrapper-narrow"><dynamic-object type="jocchartid" resource-id="6f095f56-8498-498c-b802-0e167eafd666"></dynamic-object></div>For the container shipping industry, Alix’s “Altman Z” score, which measures the likelihood of bankruptcy (the lower the number, the greater the risk), was 1.19 in 2016. That was the year of the Hanjin bankruptcy, the Cosco/China Shipping merger, CMA CGM’s acquisition of APL, Maersk announcing plans to buy Hamburg Sud, and key milestones in the Hapag-Lloyd/United Arab Shipping merger that was finalized in 2017. By 2025, it was more than twice as high, indicating much greater financial health, the Alix data shows. Van Trooijen believes there exists a window for carriers to engage in consolidation deals while they are financially robust in order to address the structural inequities before they become increasingly apparent As he <a href="https://www.joc.com/article/in-wake-of-zim-deal-the-time-for-industry-consolidation-is-now-6179297">wrote on JOC.com recently</a>: “The container shipping industry stands at a pivotal moment. Record fleet expansion, widening scale disparities, and lingering financial reserves combine to create a rare window in which transformative deals are both feasible and strategically rational.” Contact Peter Tirschwell at <a href="mailto:peter.tirschwell@spglobal.com">peter.tirschwell@spglobal.com</a>. </div>

Could another round of container shipping consolidation be approaching? Hapag-Lloyd's planned $4.2 billion acquisition of Zim Integrated Shipping Services, announced in February, shows a growing appetite among carriers for scale, including through consolidation, despite the lack of financial hardship that drove earlier rounds of industry M&A. The risk of falling behind is acute. No. 1 carrier Mediterranean Shipping Co. (MSC), at 21.6% of the global fleet by capacity following a massive expansion since the pandemic, is now more than three times the size of No. 5 Hapag-Lloyd and No. 6 Ocean Network Express (ONE), according to Alphaliner rankings. MSC has accounted for 33.6% of total container carrier fleet growth since 2000, according to the analyst. As a result, mid-sized carriers — even those firmly within the top 10 — are realizing the urgency of building scale to remain competitive with the top carriers, pursuing that goal by aggressively acquiring tonnage and potentially considering the possibility of once unthinkable M&A. “With post-COVID and the outsized profits from that time period, you are seeing carriers focus on a ‘core’ or ‘integrator’ strategy, but in both cases, scale is still key,” Brian Nemeth, global co-leader of logistics and transportation at Alix Partners, told the Journal of Commerce. A “core” strategy would be a focus on ocean shipping and terminals while “integrator” refers to end-to-end activities including origin consolidation, warehousing, last-mile and visibility. With fewer large carriers remaining — the top 10 control more than 85% percent of the fleet today versus 48% in 1996, according to analyst Lars Jensen — merger opportunities are harder to find, though any further deals would continue a longstanding industry trend. “The liner shipping industry has seen a persistent drive towards consolidation for more than 30 years,” Jensen wrote in his book Liner Shipping 2025, published in 2017. While the Zim deal still requires approvals from the Israeli government, the fact Hapag-Lloyd was able to overcome national security and other obstacles in signing the merger agreement shows that deals some might have regarded as impossible may in fact be within reach. “I was somewhat surprised that Zim would do a deal like Hapag, for many reasons including cultural differences, but also from the point of view of Israeli national security,” consultant and former senior Maersk executive Robbert van Trooijen told the Journal of Commerce. “The fact they found a solution to this, assuming (the deal closes), they have proven there are solutions to be found,” he said. The vulnerability of mid-sized carriers For example, would Japan ever allow Ocean Network Express (ONE), which consolidated its three largest ocean carriers in 2017, to be merged into a larger combined carrier? As important as the trade-dependent nation views shipping, some believe ONE is sub-scale in the current environment, a point that could apply to several other Asian carriers. A deal to privatize South Korea’s HMM collapsed in 2024 but could one day be revived. “Assume in the next three to five years the industry, which has an unprecedented orderbook of 35% of the global existing fleet, enters a downturn,” van Trooijen said. “There must be a moment where the 1-2 million TEU players start asking themselves, ‘where do we see ourselves 10 years from now?’” The record 35% order book as a percentage of the existing fleet by itself illustrates top carriers’ aggressive pursuit of scale. As of December, the top 10 carriers controlled 79% of the order book, though the actual figure is likely around 85% when expected long-term charters are figured in, according to Alphaliner chief analyst Jan Tiedemann. Under its “2030 Strategy” unveiled in 2024, ONE aims to increase its capacity to 3 million TEUs, a 42% increase from its current fleet size. In March, it increased its stake to 48.9% in the parent company of Seaspan , the largest non-operating owner of container ships. HMM in its own 2030 strategy plan also aims to double its fleet size. Increasing the vulnerability of mid-sized carriers is the possibility the alliances they participate in break up, leaving them at the mercy of larger carriers to expand market coverage beyond what their own fleet capacity can provide. “Hapag-Lloyd leaving its prior alliance to join up with Maersk shows you can’t always depend on stable alliances,” van Trooijen said, observing an emerging disconnect between smaller carriers’ aggressive vessel orders in pursuit of scale and their underlying commercial ability to fill the ships. “In other words (in the event their alliance breaks up), the smaller players run the risk of being left out in the cold where they have big ships but don’t have scale to support that,” he added. “That could very well happen.” Carriers in good position to withstand downturn That is further reason why the Hapag/Zim deal, coming at a time when carriers remain flush with cash from the pandemic and thus, according to some, are well-prepared to weather any downturn associated with the high order book, may represent a turning point. “When we look at the industry and when we look at this downturn which we are talking about, I think the industry is very well-prepared,” S&P Global analyst Rahul Kapoor told TPM26 in March. Indeed, according to Alix Partners, the Hapag/Zim deal was announced amid a strong financial phase for the industry, a change from the prior consolidation wave culminating in 2016 and 2017 when the industry was on much shakier ground financially, illustrated by the Hanjin bankruptcy in August 2016. For the container shipping industry, Alix’s “Altman Z” score, which measures the likelihood of bankruptcy (the lower the number, the greater the risk), was 1.19 in 2016. That was the year of the Hanjin bankruptcy, the Cosco/China Shipping merger, CMA CGM’s acquisition of APL, Maersk announcing plans to buy Hamburg Sud, and key milestones in the Hapag-Lloyd/United Arab Shipping merger that was finalized in 2017. By 2025, it was more than twice as high, indicating much greater financial health, the Alix data shows. Van Trooijen believes there exists a window for carriers to engage in consolidation deals while they are financially robust in order to address the structural inequities before they become increasingly apparent As he wrote on JOC.com recently : “The container shipping industry stands at a pivotal moment. Record fleet expansion, widening scale disparities, and lingering financial reserves combine to create a rare window in which transformative deals are both feasible and strategically rational.” Contact Peter Tirschwell at peter.tirschwell@spglobal.com .

Hapag-Zim deal could ignite another merger wave in container shipping

<div class="phx-topic abstract-wrapper">Prices have more than doubled since the war started, and with fuel comprising almost 30% of operating expenses, the Hong Kong-based carrier has been forced to reduce capacity.</div>

Prices have more than doubled since the war started, and with fuel comprising almost 30% of operating expenses, the Hong Kong-based carrier has been forced to reduce capacity.

<div class="phx-topic">Cathay Pacific became the latest carrier to announce flight cuts and hikes in fuel surcharges in response to sky-high jet fuel prices that threaten to erase profitability on some routes. The Hong Kong-based airline, one of the world’s largest cargo carriers, will reduce capacity by at least 2% from mid-May to the end of June, joining United Airlines, Air India, Air New Zealand, Delta Airlines, and Vietnam Airways in trimming services to reduce fuel costs that typically comprises almost 30% of an airline’s operating cost. The price of jet fuel has surged since the Middle East war began on Feb. 28. According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the average jet fuel price in Asia and Oceania in the week ended April 10 was $217.34 per barrel (p/b), increasing from $99.40 p/b in the week ended Feb. 27. “In the past month, we have pursued every suitable means to keep our flights operating as normal...this includes adjusting the fuel surcharges in an attempt to mitigate the surge in jet fuel prices,” Cathay Pacific said in a statement Saturday. “Despite our best efforts, the measures we have taken to mitigate the heightened fuel costs have not been enough.” The Cathay Pacific cuts will involve regional flights and some to Australia, South Asia and South Africa. The carrier has also extended the suspension of flights to Dubai and Riyadh until June 30 “in view of the ongoing situation in the Middle East.” Asia sources most of its jet fuel supply from the Persian Gulf and airports in the region have been particularly hard hit by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Supply shortages have caused Vietnam Airlines to cancel 20% of its flights, while Korean Air said it has tightened internal cost-cutting measures and moved into “emergency management mode.” <h3>Fuel surcharges shoot higher </h3>Cost pressures on airlines are being amplified by sharp increases in pricing components across specific routes, according to consultancy Drewry. Fuel surcharges from Singapore to London jumped by as much as 290% in March compared to the previous month, while security surcharges rose 44% month over month on shipments from Dubai and Abu Dhabi to Amsterdam. A similar trend is emerging on India-Europe routes, where March all-in rates from Mumbai and Delhi to Madrid rose by an average of 27% in March, with a 21% surge in fuel surcharges. “The air freight market has been dealt a two-fold blow of reduced effective available capacity and increased fuel costs,” said Philip Damas, head of Drewry’s logistics practice. “About one-half of the international airfreight routes monitored by Drewry have witnessed a month-over-month price increase of 20% or greater in March 2026.” Around 30% of Asia-Europe air cargo was typically routed through Middle East hubs before the war began, mostly via Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the UAE and Doha in Qatar. Carriers based in those airports are among the world’s largest air freight operators – Qatar Airways is the world’s number three air cargo carrier, Emirates Skycargo is fourth, and Etihad is number 17. A significant volume of air freight also flows through Bahrain and Kuwait. Frederic Horst, managing director of Sydney-based Trade and Transport Group, said Kuwait and Bahrain would usually see around 300 and 240 flights a day, respectively, but in the last month the average has been two a day. “Overall, the main Gulf-facing airports are handling about 32% to 35% of their usual flights,” he said. “UAE airports are higher at about 34% to 38% and flight activity is primarily driven by home-base carriers.” Contact Greg Knowler at <a href="mailto:greg.knowler@spglobal.com">greg.knowler@spglobal.com</a>. </div>

Cathay Pacific became the latest carrier to announce flight cuts and hikes in fuel surcharges in response to sky-high jet fuel prices that threaten to erase profitability on some routes. The Hong Kong-based airline, one of the world’s largest cargo carriers, will reduce capacity by at least 2% from mid-May to the end of June, joining United Airlines, Air India, Air New Zealand, Delta Airlines, and Vietnam Airways in trimming services to reduce fuel costs that typically comprises almost 30% of an airline’s operating cost. The price of jet fuel has surged since the Middle East war began on Feb. 28. According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the average jet fuel price in Asia and Oceania in the week ended April 10 was $217.34 per barrel (p/b), increasing from $99.40 p/b in the week ended Feb. 27. “In the past month, we have pursued every suitable means to keep our flights operating as normal...this includes adjusting the fuel surcharges in an attempt to mitigate the surge in jet fuel prices,” Cathay Pacific said in a statement Saturday. “Despite our best efforts, the measures we have taken to mitigate the heightened fuel costs have not been enough.” The Cathay Pacific cuts will involve regional flights and some to Australia, South Asia and South Africa. The carrier has also extended the suspension of flights to Dubai and Riyadh until June 30 “in view of the ongoing situation in the Middle East.” Asia sources most of its jet fuel supply from the Persian Gulf and airports in the region have been particularly hard hit by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Supply shortages have caused Vietnam Airlines to cancel 20% of its flights, while Korean Air said it has tightened internal cost-cutting measures and moved into “emergency management mode.” Fuel surcharges shoot higher Cost pressures on airlines are being amplified by sharp increases in pricing components across specific routes, according to consultancy Drewry. Fuel surcharges from Singapore to London jumped by as much as 290% in March compared to the previous month, while security surcharges rose 44% month over month on shipments from Dubai and Abu Dhabi to Amsterdam. A similar trend is emerging on India-Europe routes, where March all-in rates from Mumbai and Delhi to Madrid rose by an average of 27% in March, with a 21% surge in fuel surcharges. “The air freight market has been dealt a two-fold blow of reduced effective available capacity and increased fuel costs,” said Philip Damas, head of Drewry’s logistics practice. “About one-half of the international airfreight routes monitored by Drewry have witnessed a month-over-month price increase of 20% or greater in March 2026.” Around 30% of Asia-Europe air cargo was typically routed through Middle East hubs before the war began, mostly via Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the UAE and Doha in Qatar. Carriers based in those airports are among the world’s largest air freight operators – Qatar Airways is the world’s number three air cargo carrier, Emirates Skycargo is fourth, and Etihad is number 17. A significant volume of air freight also flows through Bahrain and Kuwait. Frederic Horst, managing director of Sydney-based Trade and Transport Group, said Kuwait and Bahrain would usually see around 300 and 240 flights a day, respectively, but in the last month the average has been two a day. “Overall, the main Gulf-facing airports are handling about 32% to 35% of their usual flights,” he said. “UAE airports are higher at about 34% to 38% and flight activity is primarily driven by home-base carriers.” Contact Greg Knowler at greg.knowler@spglobal.com .

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Cathay Pacific cuts flights as soaring jet fuel prices hit operating costs

<div class="phx-topic abstract-wrapper">The railroads say they plan to file an updated merger application on April 30, addressing many of the complaints that caused regulators to deem their original application “incomplete.”</div>

The railroads say they plan to file an updated merger application on April 30, addressing many of the complaints that caused regulators to deem their original application “incomplete.”

<div class="phx-topic">Newport, Rhode Island — Union Pacific Railroad (UP) and Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) say an updated merger application they plan to file with US regulators on April 30 will include revised forecasts on truck-to-rail conversions, clearer explanations of key proposals, and specific changes aimed at addressing critics of the deal. Executives from the two railroads, speaking Thursday at the North East Association of Rail Shippers (NEARS) Conference, said they’ve received traffic data from competitors BNSF Railway, Canadian National, Canadian Pacific Kansas City and CSX Transportation through a reciprocal discovery process. The data was not included in the original merger application that was <a href="https://www.joc.com/article/stb-rejects-up-ns-merger-application-as-incomplete-6154074">deemed “incomplete” by the US Surface Transportation Board (STB) in mid-January</a>. UP and NS believe the revised filing will convince regulators that combining the rail networks to create the US’ first transcontinental railroad would enhance competition and pull traffic off US highways. “We’ve now gone back, we’ve redone that work with 100% of the carload [volume] files from all the railroads,” Todd Rynaski, UP’s senior vice president of strategy, said at the NEARS event. “All of that work landed us about at the same spot, although [with a] little bit of shift between intermodal and carload [forecasts]. We feel very confident in the initial thesis.” In the original application, UP and NS forecast 2 million overall conversions to rail, including 1.17 million truckload conversions to intermodal. <h3>‘Committed Gateway Pricing’ </h3>Mike McClellan, chief strategy officer for NS, said the updated filing will better explain what the railroads call “Committed Gateway Pricing.” The program would give CSX Transportation and BNSF preset rates for traffic moving over a combined UP-NS network, allowing those railroads to quote a single end-to-end price more quickly to shippers. It would apply only to manifest carload freight, not intermodal. The railroads say the aim is to generate instant rate quotes and make rail more competitive with trucking. “We're going to spend a lot more time, really one-on-one, with the participating railroads and the shippers, especially, to make sure that they fully understand what it is, how it works, and the benefits,” McClellan said at the conference. “That was probably the most misunderstood part of the [original] application.” <h3>Addressing St. Louis </h3>UP and NS also said the revised application will clarify their plans for the Terminal Railroad Association (TRRA) of St. Louis, the switching railroad jointly owned by five of the six North American Class I railroads that helps move freight through the city. Instead of each railroad managing its own traffic in St. Louis, the TRRA receives railcars and then organizes trains to cross the Mississippi River and handoff to other Class I railroads. The arrangement is intended to keep traffic flowing safely and in an orderly fashion through a major interchange location. Under the proposed transaction, Union Pacific would inherit Norfolk Southern’s stake and gain a majority of seats on the TRRA board of directors. CSX has argued that Union Pacific could use that position to influence access and pricing across the river. The STB agreed that the issue raised significant enough competitive concerns to classify the TRRA stake proposal as a “major transaction” and that the original application understated the competitive risks in St. Louis. “We do not intend to ever control the TRRA, and we’ve got that outlined explicitly in the revised application,” Rynaski said. <h3>Meridian Speedway solution requires cash </h3>Although the STB declined to <a href="https://www.joc.com/article/stb-declines-to-intervene-on-meridian-speedway-dispute-6187000">intercede in a dispute over the Meridian Speedway</a>, there is a growing understanding that the issue must be resolved for the merger transaction to yield the rewards detailed in the application. The dispute centers around a 300-mile stretch of track between Shreveport, Louisiana, and Meridian, Mississippi, that is critical for UP and NS to connect Southern California to the US Southeast. Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CPKC), which operates the Meridian joint venture with Norfolk Southern, has enforced an 8,500-foot train length limit based on siding capacity, rejecting efforts by UP and NS to run 11,000-foot trains. CPKC owns a majority stake in the joint venture, so it dictates the rules. UP has complained that containers take too long to cross the Meridian Speedway because of the restrictions. The original application, however, envisioned 11,000-foot trains moving between the West Coast and Atlanta, Charlotte and Jacksonville despite CPKC’s current restriction. McClellan described Norfolk Southern’s relationship with CPKC as “wobbly,” but said he expects UP, NS, and CPKC to reach a solution on Meridian, likely by extending several sidings along the route to handle longer trains. “Over time, I’m sure, we’ll have a very constructive conversation with [CPKC] to put money in the ground to make these issues go away,” he said. Contact Ari Ashe at <a href="ari.ashe@spglobal.com">ari.ashe@spglobal.com</a>.</div>

Newport, Rhode Island — Union Pacific Railroad (UP) and Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) say an updated merger application they plan to file with US regulators on April 30 will include revised forecasts on truck-to-rail conversions, clearer explanations of key proposals, and specific changes aimed at addressing critics of the deal. Executives from the two railroads, speaking Thursday at the North East Association of Rail Shippers (NEARS) Conference, said they’ve received traffic data from competitors BNSF Railway, Canadian National, Canadian Pacific Kansas City and CSX Transportation through a reciprocal discovery process. The data was not included in the original merger application that was deemed “incomplete” by the US Surface Transportation Board (STB) in mid-January . UP and NS believe the revised filing will convince regulators that combining the rail networks to create the US’ first transcontinental railroad would enhance competition and pull traffic off US highways. “We’ve now gone back, we’ve redone that work with 100% of the carload [volume] files from all the railroads,” Todd Rynaski, UP’s senior vice president of strategy, said at the NEARS event. “All of that work landed us about at the same spot, although [with a] little bit of shift between intermodal and carload [forecasts]. We feel very confident in the initial thesis.” In the original application, UP and NS forecast 2 million overall conversions to rail, including 1.17 million truckload conversions to intermodal. ‘Committed Gateway Pricing’ Mike McClellan, chief strategy officer for NS, said the updated filing will better explain what the railroads call “Committed Gateway Pricing.” The program would give CSX Transportation and BNSF preset rates for traffic moving over a combined UP-NS network, allowing those railroads to quote a single end-to-end price more quickly to shippers. It would apply only to manifest carload freight, not intermodal. The railroads say the aim is to generate instant rate quotes and make rail more competitive with trucking. “We're going to spend a lot more time, really one-on-one, with the participating railroads and the shippers, especially, to make sure that they fully understand what it is, how it works, and the benefits,” McClellan said at the conference. “That was probably the most misunderstood part of the [original] application.” Addressing St. Louis UP and NS also said the revised application will clarify their plans for the Terminal Railroad Association (TRRA) of St. Louis, the switching railroad jointly owned by five of the six North American Class I railroads that helps move freight through the city. Instead of each railroad managing its own traffic in St. Louis, the TRRA receives railcars and then organizes trains to cross the Mississippi River and handoff to other Class I railroads. The arrangement is intended to keep traffic flowing safely and in an orderly fashion through a major interchange location. Under the proposed transaction, Union Pacific would inherit Norfolk Southern’s stake and gain a majority of seats on the TRRA board of directors. CSX has argued that Union Pacific could use that position to influence access and pricing across the river. The STB agreed that the issue raised significant enough competitive concerns to classify the TRRA stake proposal as a “major transaction” and that the original application understated the competitive risks in St. Louis. “We do not intend to ever control the TRRA, and we’ve got that outlined explicitly in the revised application,” Rynaski said. Meridian Speedway solution requires cash Although the STB declined to intercede in a dispute over the Meridian Speedway , there is a growing understanding that the issue must be resolved for the merger transaction to yield the rewards detailed in the application. The dispute centers around a 300-mile stretch of track between Shreveport, Louisiana, and Meridian, Mississippi, that is critical for UP and NS to connect Southern California to the US Southeast. Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CPKC), which operates the Meridian joint venture with Norfolk Southern, has enforced an 8,500-foot train length limit based on siding capacity, rejecting efforts by UP and NS to run 11,000-foot trains. CPKC owns a majority stake in the joint venture, so it dictates the rules. UP has complained that containers take too long to cross the Meridian Speedway because of the restrictions. The original application, however, envisioned 11,000-foot trains moving between the West Coast and Atlanta, Charlotte and Jacksonville despite CPKC’s current restriction. McClellan described Norfolk Southern’s relationship with CPKC as “wobbly,” but said he expects UP, NS, and CPKC to reach a solution on Meridian, likely by extending several sidings along the route to handle longer trains. “Over time, I’m sure, we’ll have a very constructive conversation with [CPKC] to put money in the ground to make these issues go away,” he said. Contact Ari Ashe at ari.ashe@spglobal.com .

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North-American rail

Intermodal providers

Revised UP-NS merger application will address deficiencies, critics concerns

<div class="phx-topic abstract-wrapper">As if the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea haven’t caused enough concern for commercial shipping, Lars Jensen warns of the potential for weather-related disruptions once again at the canal by year-end. </div>

As if the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea haven’t caused enough concern for commercial shipping, Lars Jensen warns of the potential for weather-related disruptions once again at the canal by year-end.

<div class="phx-topic">The entire shipping industry, and most certainly shippers needing to get cargo moved, is yearning for some semblance of stability and predictability to return. If this is the message you are seeking, you should not read further. While all eyes are on the Strait of Hormuz as well as the Red Sea crisis and their inevitable domino effects, it is prudent to look deeper into another potential issue: the Panama Canal. No, not from the geopolitical perspective where Panama is presently squeezed between US and Chinese interests. That is an uncertainty unto itself. <div class="wrapper-narrow float-right-element"><img src="/images/phoenix/6202588_0.1.jpg"></img></div>The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issues a monthly outlook for the El Niño/La Niña weather phenomenon. These are shifting weather patterns occurring in the Pacific, and among the many effects driven by the weather pattern is an impact on rainfall in Panama. When we have the El Niño pattern, this can lead to reduced rainfall in Panama, which in turn impacts the water level in Lake Gatun in central Panama. This is the water basin used to operate the locks in the Panama Canal. If the water level drops too far, it leads to restrictions on vessels being able to transit the Panama Canal. The water level in Lake Gatun generally varies between 85 and 88 feet. The latest El Niño was in 2023–24, and it was categorized as “strong.” This led to Lake Gatun water levels dropping to 79.2 feet, which was the third-lowest recorded since 1965, when measurements began. As many might remember from two years ago, this resulted in significant capacity restrictions on shipping through the Panama Canal. We saw a “weak” El Niño in 2018–20. (Note that “weak,” “strong,” etc. are the official designations placed on each El Niño by NOAA depending on intensity). Here we also saw Lake Gatun drop below 80 feet, although for a considerably shorter period than in 2023–24. The one before that was a “very strong” El Niño in 2015–16 that had water levels drop almost to 78 feet, the lowest level ever recorded. There were five “weak” or “moderate” El Niño periods from 1999 to 2015, all with limited impact on the canal water level. Prior to that, 1997–98 was a “very strong” El Niño, leading to water levels dropping to 78.5 feet, the second-lowest ever recorded. The historical data is quite clear. A “strong” or “very strong” El Niño tends to result in a significant decline in Lake Gatun water levels. A weaker El Niño might at times do that, but usually not. <h3>Shippers should begin planning </h3>On Thursday, the outlook from NOAA noted a 61% chance of El Niño emerging this May–July and persisting at least until the end of 2026. NOAA also predicted a 51% chance by year-end that it will be either “strong” or “very strong,” with equal risk between the two. This means that based on the current weather models, there is essentially a 50/50 risk that by the end of the year we will have an El Niño pattern of a magnitude that historically has a high likelihood of significantly reducing the water levels in Lake Gatun. And with this comes the risk of renewed, albeit temporary, capacity restrictions through the canal. Weather and climate forecasts are, by nature, probabilistic, and no one can give a certain prediction. Instead, shippers depending on cargo flows through the Panama Canal might at this time contemplate whether this 50/50 risk should be ignored, be used as a reason for planning contingency measures or be used to look at possible changes to the current supply chain setup. Lars Jensen is CEO and partner at Vespucci Maritime. Contact him at <a href="mailto:lars.jensen@vespucci-maritime.com">lars.jensen@vespucci-maritime.com</a>. </div>

The entire shipping industry, and most certainly shippers needing to get cargo moved, is yearning for some semblance of stability and predictability to return. If this is the message you are seeking, you should not read further. While all eyes are on the Strait of Hormuz as well as the Red Sea crisis and their inevitable domino effects, it is prudent to look deeper into another potential issue: the Panama Canal. No, not from the geopolitical perspective where Panama is presently squeezed between US and Chinese interests. That is an uncertainty unto itself. The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issues a monthly outlook for the El Niño/La Niña weather phenomenon. These are shifting weather patterns occurring in the Pacific, and among the many effects driven by the weather pattern is an impact on rainfall in Panama. When we have the El Niño pattern, this can lead to reduced rainfall in Panama, which in turn impacts the water level in Lake Gatun in central Panama. This is the water basin used to operate the locks in the Panama Canal. If the water level drops too far, it leads to restrictions on vessels being able to transit the Panama Canal. The water level in Lake Gatun generally varies between 85 and 88 feet. The latest El Niño was in 2023–24, and it was categorized as “strong.” This led to Lake Gatun water levels dropping to 79.2 feet, which was the third-lowest recorded since 1965, when measurements began. As many might remember from two years ago, this resulted in significant capacity restrictions on shipping through the Panama Canal. We saw a “weak” El Niño in 2018–20. (Note that “weak,” “strong,” etc. are the official designations placed on each El Niño by NOAA depending on intensity). Here we also saw Lake Gatun drop below 80 feet, although for a considerably shorter period than in 2023–24. The one before that was a “very strong” El Niño in 2015–16 that had water levels drop almost to 78 feet, the lowest level ever recorded. There were five “weak” or “moderate” El Niño periods from 1999 to 2015, all with limited impact on the canal water level. Prior to that, 1997–98 was a “very strong” El Niño, leading to water levels dropping to 78.5 feet, the second-lowest ever recorded. The historical data is quite clear. A “strong” or “very strong” El Niño tends to result in a significant decline in Lake Gatun water levels. A weaker El Niño might at times do that, but usually not. Shippers should begin planning On Thursday, the outlook from NOAA noted a 61% chance of El Niño emerging this May–July and persisting at least until the end of 2026. NOAA also predicted a 51% chance by year-end that it will be either “strong” or “very strong,” with equal risk between the two. This means that based on the current weather models, there is essentially a 50/50 risk that by the end of the year we will have an El Niño pattern of a magnitude that historically has a high likelihood of significantly reducing the water levels in Lake Gatun. And with this comes the risk of renewed, albeit temporary, capacity restrictions through the canal. Weather and climate forecasts are, by nature, probabilistic, and no one can give a certain prediction. Instead, shippers depending on cargo flows through the Panama Canal might at this time contemplate whether this 50/50 risk should be ignored, be used as a reason for planning contingency measures or be used to look at possible changes to the current supply chain setup. Lars Jensen is CEO and partner at Vespucci Maritime. Contact him at lars.jensen@vespucci-maritime.com .

El Niño forecast suggests risk of low water levels along Panama Canal

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